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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2721 
_____________ 
 
JASON RIMEL,  
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 11-538) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 28, 2013) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
After the Social Security Administration denied him disability insurance benefits 
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(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI), Appellant Jason Rimel sought review of 
the decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  The District Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s benefits and he filed 
this timely appeal. 
For substantially the same reasons that the District Court affirmed the denial of 
benefits, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
Appellant, a high school graduate, was thirty-one years old at the onset of his 
alleged disability.  For approximately thirteen years prior to his alleged disability, he 
worked as a package sorter for United Parcel Service (otherwise known as “UPS”).  Due 
to various symptoms related to depression and anxiety, Appellant quit his job in June 
2005 and has felt too incapacitated to return to work ever since.  In addition, Appellant 
was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
prescribed medication.  After he stopped working, Appellant lived with his parents but 
managed to carry on a semi-normal existence, helping with household chores, driving, 
caring for his dog, lifting weights, hunting, drawing as a hobby, and occasionally 
socializing with friends and girlfriends. 
On January 14, 2007, Appellant applied for DIB and SSI from the Social Security 
3 
 
Administration.  After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Appellant 
did not qualify as disabled under the Social Security Administration’s five-step rubric and 
denied him DIB and SSI.  Upon appellate administrative review, the ALJ’s decision was 
vacated and remanded for further consideration, with specific instructions for the ALJ to 
consider the opinion of Appellant’s treating psychiatrist, Sharon G. Rechter, M.D.  On 
remand, the ALJ1
 
 also sought an independent paper review of Appellant’s records by 
another psychiatrist, Richard Cohen, M.D.  After another hearing, the ALJ again found 
that Appellant failed to qualify for DIB and SSI. 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review is plenary but, as the District Court did, we only review the ALJ’s 
decision to deny social security benefits for substantial evidence.  Chandler v. Commn’r 
of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Substantial evidence requires that the 
ALJ’s findings rely on evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”  Id. (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 
2003)). 
 
                                                 
1 The initial ALJ was Donald T. McDougall.  J.E. Sullivan was the ALJ assigned on 
remand. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 Appellant argues that the ALJ’s decision was not founded on substantial evidence 
because the ALJ discredited the opinion of Appellant’s treating physician and was biased 
against him. 
 
A. Lack of Deference to the Treating Psychiatrist 
 While an ALJ must give great weight to a claimant’s treating physician, an ALJ  
may discredit the treating physician’s opinion if other evidence contradicts it.  Morales v. 
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361.  Here, it was 
appropriate for the ALJ to discredit Rechter’s opinion.  It was unsupported by Rechter’s 
own medical documentation (which was internally inconsistent), contradicted by other 
medical evidence (particularly the July 13, 2009 assessment of P. Iyengar, M.D.), and 
undermined by Cohen’s assessment.  As the District Court explained, Cohen faulted 
Rechter’s evaluation for downplaying Appellant’s alcohol and drug abuse.  Further, 
Appellant’s own testimony about his daily activities, which included socializing with 
friends and hunting, conflicted with Rechter’s assessment that his ability to function was 
severely limited. 
 
B. Bias 
 In determining Appellant’s ability to function, the ALJ pursued a line of questions 
that probed Appellant’s love life and sexual relations with female interests.  Appellant 
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contends that this demonstrated that the ALJ was biased against him and prevented him 
from receiving a full and fair hearing because the questions embarrassed him.  Such 
questions, while of a very personal nature, do not reflect any bias by the ALJ and did not 
impede the ALJ’s responsibility to help Appellant develop a full and fair factual record.  
See Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1995).  If anything, these questions 
were part of the ALJ’s legitimate inquiry into Appellant’s ability to interact with other 
people, which was salient to the ALJ making a fair and informed decision about his 
alleged disability. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the May 16, 2012 order of the District 
Court. 
 
